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“Thinking or not thinking, both always
perfect, neither ever stepping from the
ground.”
Zen saying
Mind wandering, task-independent thou-
ght, spontaneous thinking, free associat-
ing, creative imagining are some of the
terms used to describe what occurs to our
mind when we notice its functioning, or
when we allow it the freedom to be in its
natural condition: open, aware and spon-
taneously fluid. That such mentation is
being increasingly declared as undesirable,
is perhaps a sign of the times: seduced by
a promise of digital perfection and vir-
tual reality, we are forgetting that life is a
lived experience in which meaning unfolds
through a process of being embodied, as
ourminds “wander” from the unconscious
and preconscious, to fully conscious. Thus,
the question is not whether we can be free
of thoughts and performwith ever increas-
ing efficiency, but whether we are authen-
tic and present to all of our being, includ-
ing the wandering mind. Those back-
ground spontaneous thoughts that at first
introspection appear to be task-unrelated,
may on a closer look reveal a deeper mean-
ing, whose significance is both task-related
and self-related, as authentic being con-
tains both the extrinsic task-related and
intrinsic self-related aspects of experience.
To the extent that mind wandering serves
a function of dissociating and avoiding
the awareness of certain aspects of one’s
present experience, it could be said to be
related to unhappiness. But making a sim-
ple causal link between mind-wandering
and unhappiness ignores the larger situ-
atedness of both as manifestations of self-
meaning and self-organization.
The fact that our life is a participatory
experience that contains a dimension of
relatedness with environment and other
human beings and which reveals an ongo-
ing dynamic flux between self-referential
and other-referential concerns, has been
a challenge and a source of bewilderment
for us, seemingly from the dawn of civ-
ilization. Our instinctive impulse is to
manage this situation by creating rigidi-
fied constructs and boundaries that frag-
ment experience into competing dualities
of subject vs. object, self vs. other, in-
group vs. out-group, good vs. bad. Yet
such an instinctive solution tends to cre-
ate a host of other problems and turns the
existential unease into an outright suffer-
ing. Attempts at solution advocated over
the centuries by the various contempla-
tive traditions often include reductionist
strategies for collapsing experience into
one or the other pole of duality, either
emphasizing the self-related (subjective),
or other-related (objective) pole, while
de-emphasizing and devaluing the other,
sometimes even abolishing both in kind
of non-conscious void (Sharma, 1987).
These strategies have at times been seen as
goals in themselves, other times as stages
in the progress of meditation (Lutz et al.,
2007). What they have in common is the
approach of using various attentional and
other cognitive control strategies to sup-
press the unwanted aspect of experience
from arising. In doing so, these techniques
inadvertently create yet another layer of
fragmentation.
The dualistic structuring of experience
may have an interesting parallel in the
global organization of the cortex into the
intrinsic default network involved in self-
referential processing, and the extrinsic
or task-positive network involved in per-
ceiving and acting in the environment
(Golland et al., 2007; Soddu et al., 2009).
Increases in the activation and functional
connectivity in the areas of default net-
work have been found with meditations
that emphasize the subjective pole of
experience (Yamamoto et al., 2006; Travis
et al., 2010; Lou et al., 2011), while
increases in activations and functional
connectivity in the areas of the task-related
extrinsic network have been found with
meditations that emphasize the objective
pole of experience. Additionally, medita-
tions that emphasize the objective pole
of experience are often accompanied by
a decrease of activation in the areas of
default network, as well as increased func-
tional segregation between the two net-
works (Pagnoni et al., 2008; Brewer et al.,
2011; Kilpatrick et al., 2011).
The majority of meditation studies
done in the past several years belong to this
second category, including both focused
attention (FA) and mindfulness medita-
tions (OM). As a result, a prevalent view of
the neuroscience of meditation is emerg-
ing, according to which the main effect of
meditation is a suppression of the activ-
ity of the default network, and an increase
in its functional segregation from the task-
positive extrinsic network (Fell, 2012).
This tallies with those interpretations of
Buddhist philosophy that see the goal
of meditation as abolishing of the sense of
self or subjective reference (Austin, 2011).
Since spontaneous thinking is primarily
seen as being self-referential, such think-
ing is supposed to be abolished as well. On
these views, much of cognitive and affec-
tive processing is believed to cease with
successful meditation, and one’s experi-
ence becomes reduced to present sensory
awareness, which accommodates a self as
an agent in the world, but not a self
as a knower of its own states and con-
tents (Christoff et al., 2011). In terms of
the neuroscience, this view emphasizes the
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lateral extrinsic areas of the brain over
the medial intrinsic ones, sometimes see-
ing the subcortical brainstem structures
and thalamus as involved in representing
a core phenomenal self. (Christoff et al.,
2011; Vago and Silbersweig, 2012). It also
relies on a somewhat reductionist view of
the function of intrinsic default network,
as a seat of the narrative autobiographi-
cal self (Farb et al., 2007). But as recent
research shows, default network is also
involved in much of what we regard as
uniquely human consciousness, including
self-awareness, future planning and mak-
ing decisions about one’s current personal
state, constructing a scene from memory,
as well as mind-wandering (Mason et al.,
2007; Smallwood et al., 2008; Christoff
et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010;
Preminger et al., 2011).
When the mind is allowed to be free, its
spontaneous activity reveals two aspects:
the arising and passing of thoughts and
other mental contents, and the back-
ground nondual awareness—an open,
awake cognizance that precedes concep-
tualization and intention, and contextual-
izes and unifies both extrinsic task-positive
and intrinsic self-referential mental pro-
cesses, without fragmenting the field of
experience into opposing dualities. This
background awareness appears in medi-
tation to be self-same and unchanging,
an empty cognizance devoid of content,
while various sensory, affective, and cog-
nitive contents, and the various states of
arousal, appear to it as dynamic pro-
cesses or, as a well-known metaphor states,
like images in a mirror (Lama, 2004). Is
this awareness merely a degree of inte-
gration of different aspects of experience?
Taxonomies found in the nondual tradi-
tions, and the anecdotal accounts of med-
itation practitioners over many centuries,
indicate that this might be a distinct level
of consciousness, one that has not yet been
conceptualized within the mainstream of
neuroscience.
Mental states cultivated in meditation
are quite complex and the neural signa-
tures we have been able to detect so far
are almost certainly only a small part of
what is going on in the brain during such
states. Meditation methods that attempt
to suppress and control various aspects of
experience, in addition to being unneces-
sarily arduous and potentially hazardous,
may be violating basic principles of brain
organization: the brain, and the cortex
in particular, is not organized into dis-
crete self-sufficient modules with singular
functions that can be turned on and off
as needed. Rather, it is a dynamic system
where coalitions of neurons self-organize
into globally distributed networks with
intrinsic spontaneous fluctuations that
optimize the processing of information
in a context-dependent manner (Raichle,
2011; Baars et al., 2013). The relevance of
this for understandingmeditation research
is that meditation techniques do not need
to be limited to cognitive control strate-
gies that fragment and suppress aspects
of oneself. Rather, a meditation style that
allows for the natural functioning of mind,
and that recognizes the nondual ground,
can reveal a more integrated and authen-
tic being—an underlying natural unity of
intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of experi-
ence in the context of nondual awareness.
Future research could further differ-
entiate the neural mechanisms of non-
dual awareness from those of FA and
open monitoring (Josipovic et al., 2012;
Josipovic, in press) and explore the effects
of nondual awareness on a variety of
cognitive and affective processes, includ-
ing mind wandering (Travis et al., 2002;
Lutz et al., 2013). But our enthusiasm
in this direction ought to be tempered
by a warning from contemplative tradi-
tions that nondual awareness is not about
improving oneself, but about realizing
the innate freedom of authentic being
(Longchenpa, 1975). Keeping in this spirit,
future research could find ways to exam-
ine freedom and authenticity conferred by
nondual awareness.
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